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FOREWORD
This report embodies the conclusions of the commission appointed 
to investigate the causes for the failure of the St. Francis Dam on 
March 12, 1928.
California deplores the heavy loss of life and property that this 
disaster entailed. To prevent a recurrence of a like catastrophe, we 
believe it imperative that whatever lessons the failure of this dam may 
teach should be made public for the benefit of the people of our state. 
It was also our thought that the investigation into the causes of the 
failure of this dam should be made by an agency that was not in any 
way connected with the preparation of the plans, the construction, or 
the operation of the dam.
Accordingly a commission of engineers and geologists of expert 
knowledge and eminent reputation was appointed to make this study. 
The instructions given its members appear in the body of their report. 
Despite the arduous service that the investigation required, the mem­
bers of the commission served without personal compensation to them- 
selves, thus placing their report upon a high plane of unselfish public 
service. On behalf of the people of California, I extend to them the 
thanks of the state.
As the future of California depends in a large measure upon the 
storage of water, and the construction of dams, it is gratifying to note 
that this report finds that such structures can be built with entire safety 
when due regard is paid to suitability of foundations and correctness 
of design.
This is the great lesson of the disaster.
Governor of California.
Los Angeles, California, 
March 24, 1928.




Sir : Your commission to investigate the causes leading to the failure 
of the St. Francis Dam assembled in Los Angeles on the morning of 
March 19, 1928, and was met at the state offices by Mr. Bert B. Meek, 
Director of Public Works, and Mr. Edward Hyatt, State Engineer. 
The initial session of the commission was called to order by Mr. Meek 
as your personal representative, who delivered your instructions as 
follows:
“Not only California, but all the nation, has been appalled by 
the dreadful calamity which has befallen the beautiful little Santa 
Clara River Valley in Los Angeles and Ventura counties. This is a 
matter in which there are obviously three parties at interest— 
the stricken area of the two counties, the city of Los Angeles, and 
the public at large. All of these are obviously equally anxious to 
learn all of the facts connected with this disaster.
“I accordingly feel that it is a duty of the state to assemble 
a commission of eminent engineers and scientists to investigate the 
causes leading to the failure of the St. Francis Dam.
“The prosperity of California is largely tied up with the storage 
of its flood waters. We must have reservoirs in which to store 
these waters if the state is to grow. We can not have reservoirs 
without dams. These dams must be made safe for the people living 
below them. All this is both elemental and fundamental.
“Accordingly our duty is a double one. We must learn, if it is 
possible, just what caused the failure of the St. Francis Dam; the 
lesson that it teaches must be incorporated into the construction 
of future dams. There must be no repetition of this catastrophe 
if it is humanly possible to prevent it.”
Guided by such instructions, the commission has carried out its 
investigations in field and office. Mr. Meek and Mr. Hyatt have held 
themselves constantly available for consultation and aid, and it is 
only through their assistance that the commission has been able to 
complete its work within such a limited time.
Through the cooperation of Mr. Wm. Mulholland, chief engineer and 
general manager of the Bureau of Water Works and Supply, city of 
Los Angeles, your commission has been furnished plans, photographs 
and other data concerning the design, construction and operation of the 
St. Francis Dam. These data include the results of certain measure­
ments and surveys made after the disaster.
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Independent surveys and measurements were made for the commis- 
sion by the forces under Mr. C. C. Cortelyou, district engineer of the 
California Highway Commission. The state highway force also secured 
all test specimens selected by your commission, and preparation and 
testing of these specimens were carried out under the direction of Mr. 
W. A. Perkins, hydraulic engineer of the State Engineer’s Office. 
Mr. Perkins also prepared the table of discharge deduced from the 
chart made by the water register on top of the dam.
Geological conditions at the dam site have been the subject of care­
ful study by Dr. George D. Louderback, and by Dr. F. L. Ransome, 
members of the commission.
DESCRIPTION OP ST. FRANCIS DAM
Construction of the dam was begun in April, 1924, and the structure 
completed May 4, 1926. It was located on San Francisquito Creek in 
section 1, T. 5 N., R. 16 W., San Bernardino meridian, between San 
Francisquito Power House No. 1 (upstream) and Power House No. 2 
(downstream). The reservoir created by the dam was primarily for 
terminal storage near the lower end of the Los Angeles Aqueduct 
which conveys water from the Owens River region. Incidentally it 
was expected ultimately to catch the run-off from the San Francisquito 
Creek drainage area above it, of approximately 37 square miles. Legal 
rights to do this, however, had not been secured, and it is understood 
that such local waters were passed through the reservoir. The drainage 
basin of San Francisquito Creek from the dam to its junction with the 
Santa Clara River, and the course of the Santa Clara River from that 
point to the ocean, are shown on Plate 1. The drainage area above 
the dam, and the location of the Los Angeles Aqueduct and power 
plants with relation to the streams, highways, etc., are shown on the 
map, Plate 2. A profile of the nearby portion of the aqueduct, includ­
ing the St. Francis Dam and reservoir, is shown in Plate 3. It will be 
observed that water which passed to St. Francis reservoir could not be 
utilized through Power House No. 2.
The dam was of the solid gravity type, curved on a radius of 500 
feet to the upstream face at the crest. Its right or westerly end was 
continued by a wing wall which followed in general the crest of a 
narrow ridge, finally terminating at a high point about 500 feet from 
the end of the main dam; a small gap beyond this point was closed by 
a low concrete wall. The maximum cross-section, and a plan of the dam 
(including wing walls, etc.) are shown on Plate 4. The stress sheet 
is presented by Plate 5. Maps and plans furnished by the Bureau of 
Water Works and Supply show that the crest thickness of the dam 
was 16 feet, and the maximum section was 205 feet high and 175 feet 
thick at the base. The batter of the upstream face changed from 1 in 
27 to 1 in 10, and finally in the extreme bottom to 3⅜ in 10. The 
downstream face was carried up in a series of steps uniformly 5 feet 
high, and with widths varying from 5.5 feet near the bottom to 1.45 
feet near the top. The length of the main dam measured along the
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center line of the curved crest was 700 feet. The elevations above sea 
level at various points of the structure were as follows:
Crest of parapet 1,838.06 feet
Crest of spillway lip 1,835.00 feet
1st outlet upstream invert 1,799.00 feet
2d outlet upstream invert 1,763.00 feet
3d outlet upstream invert 1,727.00 feet
4th outlet upstream invert 1,691.00 feet
5th outlet upstream invert 1,658.26 feet
Bottom of maximum section 1,630.00 feet
Both faces of the crest of the dam were vertical for 23 feet. The 
downstream face of this vertical section was divided into panels 24 feet 
wide, of which eleven panels in two groups were spillways. Each spill­
way panel was 20 feet wide by 1.5 feet high clear inside dimensions. 
The five outlet pipes each 30 inches in diameter, were controlled by 
sliding gates fastened to the upstream face of the dam.
Storage of water in the reservoir began March 1, 1926, according to 
Plate 6, which gives a record of the reservoir stages to the date of 
failure. The approximate maximum storage for 1926 was 13,200 acre- 
feet at elevation 1779 on June 5. This level was maintained until about 
August 10, gradually lowered until October 5, and held thereafter at 
about 1762 until the end of the year. After January 5, 1927, the water 
was raised at a uniform rate to 1832 on May 10, where it was held 
until May 27. It was rather rapidly lowered to about 1817 June 20, 
and then with minor variations brought down to 1813 November 8, 
after which the level was raised to 1821 by December 31, 1927. From 
the beginning of 1928, when the water surface was 1821, storage was 
increased gradually until March 5, when the reservoir was practically 
filled to capacity of 38,000 acre-feet. The water level was maintained 
at 1834.75 or 0.25 foot below the spillway crest, until the time of the 
failure at 11.58 p.m., March 12, 1928.
Photographic evidence and the testimony of witnesses show that 
little seepage passed through the structure of the main dam. Certain 
cracks developed in the main structure, which possibly discharged an 
unimportant amount of water, as is not at all unusual in concrete dams. 
One or more cracks, with consequent unimportant seepage, also 
developed in the wing wall extension to the west of the main dam.
Much more important seepage is reported to have taken place through 
the foundation upon which the dam rested. As the water rose in the 
reservoir this foundation seepage appears to have increased to a maxi­
mum of between one and two second-feet on the afternoon preceding 
the failure. Rumors of muddy water seeping under or around the dam 
before its failure are in circulation, but the commission has been unable 
to verify them.
FAILURE OF THE DAM
It is reported that one of the caretakers was seen on top of the dam 
at 11 p.m., only an hour before the failure, and apparently up to this 
time there had been no alarming developments. The caretakers were
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lost in the flood, and so far as is known there is no living witness of 
the dam’s collapse.
The first indication of failure, given by the automatic water register 
located on top of the central or standing section of the dam, was a 
gradually accelerated falling of the water surface, starting about 
11.30 p.m. (corrected time) and aggregating about three-tenths of a 
foot at about 12 p.m., when the failure was indicated on the record 
by a rapid fall in the water surface.
At 11.58 p.m. there was a break in the Borel transmission line of the 
Southern California Edison Company which was located in the canyon 
immediately below the dam. At 12.03 a.m. March 13 the power from 
the Los Angeles city power plant No. 2 in the canyon about one and 
one-half miles below the dam went off.
It appears that the failure of the dam took place at, or slightly before, 
11.58 p.m., March 12, when the main dam structure, with the exception 
of a section near its middle, failed completely, leaving the greater part 
of the left or easterly portion in very large fragments at and just 
below the dam site and great blocks of concrete up to about 10,000 
tons in weight, chiefly from the right or westerly end, distributed for 
a distance of several thousand feet downstream. See Plate 8.
The magnitude and violence of the wave released on the failure of 
this dam are hard to visualize even by engineers familiar with floods 
and flood conditions. The rush of water attained a maximum depth of 
about 125 feet in the deepest of four sections measured by the commis- 
sion within three-fourths of a mile below the dam. In the vicinity of 
San Francisquito Power House No. 2, approximately 1.5 miles along 
the channel downstream from the dam, an even greater depth was 
reported. The flood wave completely carried away the heavy concrete 
power house down to the generator floor, together with the less sub­
stantial buildings occupied by the operators and their families. The 
flood followed down San Francisquito Creek 9 miles from the dam and 
then down the Santa Clara River 43.5 miles to the ocean. The velocity 
of the wave and the time required to reach the peak are data of great 
engineering interest. The following is a summary of these data now 
available to your commission.
Table of velocities of flood as noted at various locations downstream from the dam.


















Borel Power Line at Dam 11.58 p.m.
City Power Plant No. 2 12.03 a.m. 5 min. 1.5 18.0
So. Cal. Edison Co. Sub-Station 
near Saugus 12.38 a.m. 35 min. 7.5 12.9
So. Cal. Edison Co. Construction 
Camp at Kemp 1.20 a.m. 42 min. 7.5 10.7
Fillmore Bridge 2.25 a.m. 65 min. 12.7 11.7
Santa Paula 3.10 a.m. 45 min. 8.5 11.3
Saticoy Bridge 4.15 a.m. 65 min. 6.8 6.3
Montalvo Bridge 5.00 a.m. 45 min. 4.0 5.3
It seems probable that the flood peak immediately below the dam 
exceeded half a million second-feet and this, together with its occur­
rence in the darkness, and the suddenness and violence of the wave,
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was such that very few of the persons in the constricted valley below 
the dam escaped with their lives, though they were immediately 
adjacent to the safety of the steep slopes of the bordering hills. Even 
at a construction camp of the Southern California Edison Company, 
16.5 miles below the dam, more than 80 out of about 140 perished.
The damage caused in the path of the waters 52 miles to the sea was 
very great. The record of known dead at this time is 236 and 200 are 
still missing. Fortunately no trains happened to be passing over the 
railroad track inundated, and but few automobiles were on the many 
miles of highways destroyed. The total property loss of farms, 
orchards, small towns and public utilities will certainly be many 
millions of dollars.
METHODS FOLLOWED IN CONSTRUCTING THE DAM
The Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works and Supply placed at the 
commission’s disposal a complete set of construction plans and photo- 
graphs of the St, Francis Dam. By means of these, and by discussion 
of construction methods with Mr. Wm. Mulholland and several of his 
assistants, the essential construction data were ascertained.
The first step was the construction of a concrete wall 8 feet thick 
(narrowed to 5 feet at the top) and about 80 feet long at the bottom and 
155 feet at the top, placed in a trench carried down into tight material 
under the stream bed to an elevation of approximately 1638. The 
foundation of the dam was then excavated behind the wall to elevation 
1630 across the deepest part of the channel. It will be noted from 
these elevations that the foundation excavation of the dam was carried 
8 feet below the bottom of the wall. The wall was built merely to cut 
off underflow through the gravel, and small freshets that might come 
from the San Francisquito drainage during the early construction 
stages, and convey these waters through a flume past the dam site. 
Behind this wall the lowest part of the dam foundation was excavated 
in the dry, and the wall itself finally incorporated into the upstream 
face of the structure.
The east wing of the dam was notched into the rock of the canyon 
wall and carried up the natural inclined plane of the rock in the abut- 
ment, without steps, and with no cut-off wall. Under portions of the. 
west abutment and about 25 feet from the upstream face, a cut-off 
trench about 3 feet wide and 3 feet deep, probably with rounding 
bottom, was excavated longitudinally as deep as it could be carried 
by use of picks, and finished by prying out rock with gads. The 
nature of this trench can be observed by inspection of concrete sur­
faces on one large fragment from the west end of the dam that was 
carried downstream and now lies upturned showing the original contact 
with the abutment.
Relief of uplift that might be caused by water pressure underneath 
the dam was provided for only in the center, or the portion crossing 
the main channel. On a line about 30 feet in from the face of the dam, 
3 holes were bored in line at intervals of 20 feet, while along a' second 
line approximately 15 feet further downstream from the first line
there were 7 more holes also at intervals of about 20 feet. The depth of
2—59384
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these holes is variously reported to have been from 15 to 30 feet. A 
small section of pipe with collar was fitted into the top of each hole 
and cross connections were carried from these pipes to a center outlet 
pipe which was led out to the lower face near the lowest main outlet 
pipe. The amount of water draining from this system is understood 
to have been very small, and was carried down to the caretaker’s house, 
where it was used for domestic supply, lawn watering, etc. Most of 
this drainage system is included under the portion of the dam which 
remains standing; this is probably merely a coincidence.
Construction views show that a relatively small cut-off trench was 
carried along the upper side of the wing wall extending westerly along 
the ridge from the west abutment of the dam. This trench was largely 
excavated by a steam shovel.
The concrete aggregate was pit-run sand and gravel taken from the 
stream bed between one-fourth and one-half mile below the dam, where 
aggregate used in construction of the aqueduct and the San Francis- 
quito Creek power houses had been secured. The material was neither 
washed nor graded, but rocks in excess of 6 inches were excluded. It 
is stated that 1.12 barrels of Portland cement were used per cubic 
yard of concrete. Specimens deemed typical were taken and tested. 
These show a satisfactory quality of concrete.
No inspection gallery was carried through the dam, nor was any 
pressure grouting attempted under any part of the structure. Geologi­
cal conditions not only at the dam site itself, but for a short distance 
above and for a considerable distance below, were clearly disclosed 
by the scouring that took place during the discharge of water from 
the reservoir.
GEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AT THE DAM SITE
General Relations.—The geological conditions in the vicinity of the 
St. Francis Dam are both simple and obvious. San Francisquito Can- 
yon here has a course of south 60 degrees west. The bottom of the 
canyon and the steep slopes southeast of the stream way are carved 
from a fairly uniform mica schist. The gentler, less regular slope on 
the northwest side of the canyon is underlain by a reddish conglomerate, 
in rather ill-defined beds of great but undetermined total thickness. 
The contact between the two rocks is a fault which, at the dam site, 
has a strike that is approximately parallel with the course of the 
canyon and outcrops a short distance above the stream way, on its 
northwest side. The dam consequently was placed astride of the fault, 
the southeast abutment and the foundation of the middle section being 
schist and the northwest abutment being conglomerate.
The fault is plainly visible in Plates 17, 18 and 22, as a sharp line 
that separates the lighter colored schist below from the darker conglom­
erate of the upper slope.
Mica Schist.—The mica schist is an ordinary variety of this fairly 
common crystalline metamorphic rock. It consists chiefly of quartz, 
white mica and probably some feldspar. The schistose structure, due 
to the generally parallel orientation of the constituent minerals, par- 
ticularly of the mica scales, is very well developed so that the rock has
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pronounced fissility or cleavage and splits readily into thin plates. 
As a consequence of this fissility also, the rock weathers and disin- 
tegrates into small flakes or scales.
In many places the schist has been strongly sheared, commonly 
along planes that are roughly parallel with the schistosity or planes 
of lamination. Along these shear-zones the rock has been changed 
to an exceedingly fragile flaky material that can be readily excavated 
with the pick. From a structural point of view such sheared schist 
is extremely weak material.
The general strike of the schistosity is from north 60 degrees to 
north 70 degrees east, or about parallel with the course of the canyon 
at the damsite. The dip is northwesterly. Consequently the lamina- 
tion of the schist is not far from parallelism with the steep slope of the 
southeast side of the canyon. This slope, in fact, is conditioned in large 
part by the laminated structure of the schist. This same structure 
also is responsible in part for the landslides that have taken place since 
the dam failed.
The geological age of the schist is not definitely known. The rock, 
however, is probably at least pre-Cretaceous and may be pre-Cambrian.
The schist is not a soluble rock, nor is it ordinarily softened by 
wetting. It is capable of withstanding considerable pressure applied in 
directions approximately normal to its planes of lamination, but is 
very weak with respect to stresses applied in directions parallel with 
or at small angles with those planes. Under such stresses the schist 
would slip like a pack of cards thrown upon a table.
Conglomerate.—The conglomerate near the dam site strikes north 
15 degrees west and dips 46 degrees west. It is composed chiefly of 
detritus derived from the schist terrane and from granitic masses 
that are not exposed in the vicinity of the dam. The pebbles, usually 
rather small and sparsely distributed, are embedded in a relatively 
large proportion of fine-grained, sandy, micaceous, flaky detritus 
derived from schist and granite. High above the dam site on the north- 
west slope of the canyon, can be seen rounded outcrops of the con- 
glomerate that appear to be fairly well cemented and moderately resist- 
ant to erosion. At the dam, however, the rock has an entirely different 
character. As its peculiar properties at this place are at least in part 
a consequence of the faulting, previously referred to, they will be more 
fully described in connection with that feature.
The exact age of the conglomerate has not been determined, but it 
is Tertiary and probably Miocene (Mint Canyon formation) or Oligo- 
cene (Sespe formation).
San Francisquito Fault.—The fault which passes beneath the north- 
western part of the dam site has long been known and is represented 
as a “dead” fault on the Fault Map of California compiled under the 
auspices of the Seismological Society of America. The present investi­
gation shows that there has been no movement on this fault since the 
dam was built.
At the dam site, the strike of the fault is about north 51 degrees east, 
or approximately parallel with the course of the canyon. The dip, 
although variable, is generally between 30 and 45 degrees, to the north- 
west. At the dam site, a satisfactory exposure of the hanging wall of
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the slip gave a dip of 40 degrees. The same exposure showed striae 
that pitch 65 degrees to the northeast, indicative of a slip of which 
the vertical component, in the plane of the fault, is larger than the 
horizontal component.
Along the fault, next to the schist footwall, is a well defined, dark, 
gray, clay gouge, which in places is at least 8 inches wide or thick. 
This material is chiefly comminuted or triturated schist—ground to 
clay by movement on the fault. λVhen dry, the gouge is fairly hard, 
but when wet it is an unctuous, plastic clay, with some enclosed frag­
ments of schist. Under the gouge, in some places for a width of 10 
feet, the schist is crushed and sheared. On the upper, or hanging wall 
side of the main slip-plane, is a reddish gouge, composed of ground-up 
conglomerate. This gouge is generally thicker than the gray gouge 
and grades rather indefinitely into disturbed, crushed conglomerate. 
When dry, this material is firm and coherent, but becomes soft and 
plastic when wet. In places, this reddish gouge is fully 4 feet thick.
Above the foregoing material, as the slope is ascended, and extending 
all the way up the northwestern abutment to the top of the dam, the 
conglomerate is traversed in various directions by intersecting frac- 
tures, some of which contain small seams of clay gouge, and others are 
filled with gypsum. The pebbles in the conglomerate have, in many 
instances, been fractured, sheared and faulted. Finally, the whole 
mass of the conglomerate has been so minutely crushed as to have lost 
most of the strength to be expected in a rock possessing its general 
appearance. When dry, the rock is moderately hard and fragments 
of considerable size can be broken out and trimmed down with a 
hammer to specimen size. When, however, a piece of the rock is placed 
in water, a startling change takes place. Absorption proceeds rapidly, 
air bubbles are given off, flakes and particles begin to fall from the 
sides of the immersed piece, the water becomes turbid with suspended 
clay and, usually in from fifteen minutes to an hour, a piece the size of 
an orange has disintegrated into a deposit of loose sand and small frag- 
ments, covered by muddy water. Whatever may have been the original 
cementing material of the conglomerate, its efficiency has been destroyed 
by crushing, aided possibly by solution, and the rock at present is 
held together merely by films of clay. It is possible that this part of 
the conglomerate, as originally deposited, contained considerable clay 
that never became lithified.
This remarkable characteristic of the conglomerate is probably local 
and confined to a belt within some undertermined distance from the 
fault. The rounded outcrops previously referred to as appearing 
higher up the slope could scarcely exist if the conglomerate at that 
distance from the fault were equally susceptable to the disintegrating 
effect of water.
That the same process of disintegration above described was going 
on rather extensively where the conglomerate was covered by the water 
of the reservoir, is clearly shown by the character of the residual mate- 
rial left on the conglomerate where the escaping water has not cleaned 
off all of the surface material.
Clearly, when thoroughly wet, the conglomerate at the northwestern 
abutment of the dam ceased to have the characteristics commonly 
denoted by the term rock.
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Whether the movement on the fault was normal or reverse is not 
known. The fact that the conglomerate is obviously younger than the 
schist suggests a normal fault, although the rather low dip and the 
condition of the conglomerate in the hanging wall are indicative of 
overthrust.
Major Earth Movements.—A careful examination of the contact 
fault in the vicinity of the dam site shows no evidence of recent move­
ment. According to Mr. H. O. Wood in charge of the Seismological 
Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, their 
seismographs recorded no earth tremors of even slight intensity at 
any time near the time of the dam failure.
There appears to be no reason to believe that faulting or other major 
earth movement was to any degree responsible for the failure of the 
dam.
Landslides.—The mica schist which occupies the southeast side of 
the canyon shows separation planes along the schistosity, and shear sur­
faces dipping northwesterly at 30 degrees and more. The canyon 
slopes are steep and approximate the dip of the schistosity and 
shear surfaces. Landsliding is therefore always imminent and may 
be produced by any one of several causes.
Above the dam site several marked recent slides have taken place. 
One, a short distance upstream from the dam, broke the road and 
carried a large mass of rock and earth down to the floor of the valley. 
See Plates 29 and 30. A careful examination of the surface of this 
slide shows no water lines, erosion furrows, or other evidences of the 
action of the standing or moving water of the reservoir. Evidently 
the sliding occurred after the withdrawal of the water from the 
reservoir. The added weight of the infiltrated water while the reservoir 
was full, and the rapid removal of the water support when the dam 
failed are sufficient causes for the landslides above the dam.
At the east abutment of the dam and immediately below the dam 
site much recent sliding has taken place, and during the visits of the 
commission to the dam site a continuous rain of rock fragments was 
coming down the slope, accompanied by clouds of dust as shown in 
Plate 28. This sliding is evidently due to the removal of support as a 
result of the destruction of the dam and the undercutting of the slope 
by the waters released by the dam failure.
Smaller landslides and slumps are found along the slopes above the 
wing wall. These clearly followed the withdrawal of the water from 
the reservoir and were due to the removal of support from the water- 
soaked and softened outer portions of the conglomerate.
It is concluded that all of the recent landslides in the vicinity of the 
dam site took place after and as a result of the failure of the dam and 
were in no way responsible for such failure.
CONDITIONS AT THE DAM AFTER FAILURE
The wrecked westerly part of the dam from a point 70 feet west of 
the standing section to the end of the wing wall, as well as the wing 
wall that still remains, was founded on the conglomerate. Eastward
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from the base of the conglomerate across the stream bed and up the 
east side of the canyon the structure rested on schist. The contact 
between the conglomerate and schist is along a fault plane that shows 
considerable ancient movement. Water rushing through the westerly 
break in the dam has scoured both conglomerate and schist to a con­
siderable depth, the principal part of the scouring taking place toward 
the toe of the dam, probably due both to the character of the material 
at this particular location and to the fact that a ridge just upstream 
from and practically parallel to the face of the dam acted as a sub- 
merged weir over which the water poured onto the downstream part 
of the foundation. To the westward of the standing section and against 
its base a narrow channel was cut through the schist to a depth well 
below all of the concrete in the structure, with the exception of the 
concrete cofferdam sections at the upstream face and a thin section 
carrying the steps on the downstream face. It is therefore possible 
to observe the character of the material which underlay that part of 
the dam.
To the eastward of the standing section the water carried away a 
large amount of the schist not only on the side of the canyon or along 
the abutment, but in the bottom. Probably due to combined effect of 
water soaking and undercutting, a very large and conspicuous slide 
has developed on the hillside on approximately the line of the eastern 
abutment. Material was still cascading down the face of this slide 
ten days after the failure, and from observation in the field it is 
apparent that the slide movement will continue for some time.
The distance to which large masses of concrete from the dam have 
been transported is probably one of the most impressive phenomena 
of the disaster. All of the fragments from the westerly side of the dam 
have been carried some distance down stream. Many of the large 
fragments from the easterly side have moved only a short distance 
out of place and now rest against the base of the standing section, 
but several very large masses of concrete from this side have been 
carried downstream as far as the large masses from the westerly end, 
being recognizable from the inclusions of schist upon which they rested. 
One large mass from the west side is turned bottom up and the founda- 
tion material adhering to it shows that it came from the part of the 
dam directly over the contact between the conglomerate and the schist.
Discharge of water from the foundations and from seeps along con­
struction joints in the concrete of the standing section and in the masses 
washed downstream was very noticeable immediately after the break, 
when the site was inspected informally by several members of the 
commission, but had markedly decreased during the few days that 
intervened before the commission assembled and during the time that 
its investigations were under way. The most noticeable discharge was 
from the seams in the conglomerate about on a line between the stand- 
ing section of the dam and the broken end of the wing wall, and about 
two-thirds of the way up the abutment from the bottom. Very notice- 
able seeps occurred along the top of the gouge between the schist and 
the conglomerate.
A short length of the two-inch pipe that formed part of the drainage 
system along the second line of holes drilled under the dam is now
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protruding from the large slab of concrete that has broken away from 
the easterly end of the standing section. That is the only part of the 
drainage system that can now be identified.
The rapid lowering of the water in the reservoir caused several 
large landslides that are very conspicuous as shown in pictures looking 
upstream from the dam site. The most important of these is on the 
easterly side of the reservoir a short distance upstream from the dam, 
where displacement of a road shows vertical movement of approxi­
mately forty or fifty feet along the junction of surface earth and 
material that is probably very similar to that against which the east 
abutment of the dam rested.
Seepage from the water soaked slopes of the reservoir basin has 
contributed a considerable but constantly decreasing stream ever 
since the break, and four days after the disaster amounted to 15 second- 
feet.
Triangulation between stations established during construction and 
the tying in of one fixed point that is available on the top of the stand- 
ing section, show that the point has moved S. 2º 52' W. 0.70 feet. 
The course of the radius at this point was N. 51º 22' E. It is yet 
uncertain whether this movement is due to tilting, to horizontal dis- 
placement of the whole mass, or to a combination of the two. The 
surface of the conglomerate on the westerly abutment, shortly after 
the break, showed marked softening due to water soaking. After a 
few days drying this material showed clean smooth surface when 
broken, and some of the hardest specimens rang under the hammer. 
Many of these, however, go to pieces when immersed in water for a 
few hours, and samples taken over a considerable area have gone to 
pieces almost immediately upon immersion. Material from the gouge 
along the fault between the conglomerate and schist rapidly becomes 
soft and unctuous when immersed. An attempt was made to prepare 
two samples of the conglomerate for compression and absorption tests. 
One broke in preparation, and the other stood only 523 pounds per 
square inch in compression when dry. See reports from the testing 
laboratory included as Appendices.
CAUSES OF THE FAILURE
The St. Francis Dam was designed with a gravity section and was 
arched in plan. Experience has show’ll that this type of structure is 
preeminently safe and it is generally accepted by engineers all over 
the world as a conservative design.
The material in the dam is demonstrated by inspection, by tests, 
and finally by behavior of enormous blocks remaining from the wreck, 
to have been of satisfactory quality and adequate strength. Tests of 
samples cut from typical blocks showed an average crushing strength 
of about 2400 pounds per square inch, which is much beyond any 
stresses to which it could have been subjected under normal conditions.
There were no contraction joints built in the dam, which is the case 
in many existing dams, and, in any event, the failure can not be attrib­
uted to their absence.
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There can be no question but that such a dam properly built upon 
a firm and unyielding foundation would be safe and permanent under 
all conceivable conditions, except perhaps faulting and earthquake 
shocks of tremendous violence. Indeed such a dam may properly be 
deemed to be among the most durable of all man-made structures. 
Unfortunately in this case the foundation under the entire dam left 
very much to be desired. The material under the central and left, or 
easterly, end was a mica schist of thin and easily separable laminae. 
The west end was founded upon a reddish conglomerate which, even 
when dry, was of decidedly inferior strength and which, when wet 
became so soft that most of it lost almost all rock characteristics. 
Numerous samples taken from the present surface which has been 
eroded to a considerable depth below the original foundation and some 
samples from underneath the remaining west wing wall, quickly 
softened and changed into either a mushy or granular mass when 
immersed in water. Unfortunately this material is of such a nature 
that when entirely dry it is hard and rock-like in appearance and char- 
acteristics, although defective in compressive strength. Of two samples 
taken from the firmest part of the eroded foundation, one broke in 
preparation for testing and the other, cut into a 5.77-inch cylinder 
7.12 inches long, showed a compressive strength of only 523 pounds 
per square inch, or between one-fourth and one-fifth that of the concrete 
in the dam. Greater strength might have been shown had the sample 
not been moistened by exposure at the time of the dam failure, but on 
the other hand it would have been much weaker with a larger moisture 
content.
With such a formation, the ultimate failure of this dam was inevi- 
table, unless water could have been kept from reaching the foundation. 
Inspection galleries, pressure grouting, drainage wells and deep cut-off 
Avails are commonly used to prevent or remove percolation, but it is 
improbable that any or all of these devices would have been adequately 
effective, though they would have ameliorated the conditions and post- 
poned the final failure.
While as yet the manner and chronological order in which the failure 
of various sections of the structure occurred are not entirely certain, 
the present locations of the fragments from the west end indicate this 
as the point of initial failure which was quickly followed by progressive 
but rapid failure of the east end. Many of the available data indicate 
that the initial foundation failure occurred near or at the old fault 
or contact between the conglomerate and schist under the west end, 
and was due to the percolation of water into and through this section 
of the foundation, with resulting softening of the conglomerate under 
the dam. Either a blowout under, or a settling of the concrete at this 
place, or both, occurred, quickly followed by the collapse of large sec- 
tions of the dam.
It is probable that the rush of water released by failure of the west 
end caused a heavy scour against the easterly canyon wall at the toe 
of the dam. This rapidly cut away the schist including the material 
under the toe of the east part of the dam and caused the failure of 
that part of the structure. The escaping water then continued to cut 
away the schist from the east wall of the canyon until a maximum
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depth of about 30 feet below the original foundation level was reached. 
See Plate 8.
A fact which should be very reassuring as to the stability of a gravity 
dam on reasonably sound bed rock is that although the central section, 
still standing, must have been exposed to tremendous and sudden 
stresses amounting to shocks, while still subject to practically full 
water pressure, it is undisturbed except for an apparent movement 
at the top of some 5.5 inches downstream and 6 inches toward the 
easterly abutment.
The record made by the Stevens gage which was located on the 
standing middle section of the dam is shown in Plate 10. Using this 
record in connection with the known areas and capacities of the 
reservoir at varying water elevations, the following table has been 
made:
Discharge from St. Francis Reservoir, deduced from copy of chart from automatic 
water-stage register located on top of the portion of the dam that remains in 









2 p.m. 12 midnight 0.03 22
March 13, 1928
12 midnight 12-06 a.m. 0.01 740
12-06 a.m. 12-14 " 0.04 2,200
12-14 " 12-20 " 0.05 3,680
12-20 " 12-24 " 0.05 5,520
12-24 " 12-26.7 " 0.05 8,160
12-26.7 " 12-29 " 0.05 9,600
12-29 " 12-30.5 " 0.05 14,700
12-30.5 " 12-31.5 " 0.05 22,000
12-31.5 " 12-32.2 " 0.05 31,500
12-32.2 " 12-33.4 " 0.10 36,700
12-33.4 " 12-34.3 " 0.10 48,900
12-34.3 " 12-34.9 " 0.10 73,300
12-34.9 " 12-35.3 " 0.10 110,000
12-35.3 " 12-3 5.5 " 0.10 220,000
12-35.5 " 12-35.65 " 0.10 293,000
12-35.65 " 12-35.75 " 0.10 438,300
Too much reliance must not be placed upon this, as the horizontal 
or time scale of the record is very small and the accuracy of the clock 
movement is not certain. However, for at least many hours before the 
record ends there clearly were no water surface fluctuations except a 
lowering beginning about 2 p.m., which was so slight that it might have 
been due to upstream wind movement.
This record shows that a water subsidence which could not have been 
due to upstream winds began about one-half hour before the flow 
from the reservoir reached enormous proportions, and further, that the 
curve of emptying is regular up to that point. Such accelerating water 
lowering, as opposed to an abrupt fall, is apparently contradictory 
to many data reported as to suddenness of the downstream movement 
of the flood wave, especially at Power House No. 2, where there appears 
to have been no such warning as would have been given by a gradually 
increasing stream flow such as would have resulted from anything like 
the deduced record given in the table.
In so far, however, as the validity of this record is accepted, the dis- 




1. The failure of St. Francis Dam was due to defective foundations.
2. There is nothing in the failure of the St. Francis Dam to indicate 
that the accepted theory of gravity dam design is in error or that there 
is any question about the safety of concrete dams designed in accord- 
ance with that theory when built upon even ordinarily sound bed rock. 
On the contrary, the action of the middle section which remains stand- 
ing, even under such adverse conditions, is most convincing evidence of 
the stability of such structures when built upon firm and durable bed 
rock.
3. The failure of this dam indicates the desirability of having all 
such structures erected and maintained under the supervision and 
control of state authorities. Water storage, with its necessary con- 
comitant dams and embankments, is peculiarly essential to the develop­
ment of California resources, and in the great majority of cases failures 
would result in serious loss of life and property. This disaster 
emphasizes the fact that while the benefits accrue to the builders of 
such projects, the failures bring disaster to others who have no control 
over the design, construction and maintenance of the works. The police 
power of the state certainly ought to be extended to cover all structures 
impounding any considerable quantities of water.
Respectfully submitted.
A. J. Wiley, Chairman, Boise, Idaho.
Consulting Engineer.
Geo. D. Louderback, Berkeley, California. 
Professor of Geology,
University of California.
F. L. Ransome, Pasadena, California.
Professor of Economic Geology,
California Institute of Technology.
F. E. Bonner, San Francisco, California.
District Engineer, U. S. Forest Service
and California Representative of Federal 
Power Commission.
H. T. Cory, Los Angeles, California.
Consulting Engineer.
F. H. Fowler, San Francisco, California.
Consulting Engineer.
— 19 —
State of California 
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE 
Sacramento
C. C. YOUNG 
GOVERNOR
April 20, 1928.
Mr. A. J. Wiley, Chairman,
And Associate Members of
St. Francis Dam Commission.
Gentlemen : Your report of the causes leading to the failure of 
the St. Francis Dam is herewith placed in the hands of the public, with 
the highest appreciation of the ability and painstaking care with which 
you performed the arduous task which was submitted to you.
While fully cognizant of the appalling loss of life and great destruc­
tion of property caused by this frightful disaster, it is at the same time 
self-evident that the full development of this great commonwealth 
requires that her water resources be fully conserved. This can be done 
only by continuing the construction of great dams, such as those which 
are now doing their work without sign of weakness. I am pleased to 
note that you have called attention in your report to the fact that such 
structures can be built with entire safety when constructed on proper 
foundations and correctly designed.
On behalf of the people of California I wish to thank you for this 
valuable and eminently fair report, prepared by you as a public service, 
and without personal compensation.
Yours very sincerely,
Governor of California.
To: A. J. Wiley, Chairman, Consulting Engineer, Boise, Idaho.
Geo. D. Louderback, Professor of Geology, University of Cali- 
fornia, Berkeley, California,
F. L. Ransome, Professor of Economic Geology, California Insti- 
tute of Technology, Pasadena, California.
F. E. Bonner, District Engineer, U. S. Forest Service, and Cali­
fornia Representative Federal Power Commission, San Fran­
cisco, California.
H. T. Cory, Consulting Engineer, Los Angeles, California.
F. H. Fowler, Consulting Engineer, San Francisco, California.
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REPORT OF COMPRESSION TEST OF ROCK 
Test made for: Commission appointed by Governor Young to investigate failure of
St. Francis Dam.
Description of specimen: Cylindrical core, 5.77 inches diameter, 7.12 inches high, cut 
from sample selected by the Commission at the dam site. Core was 
cut by L. A. County Road Department in presence of Mr. Perkins 





Weight, total lbs., 15.21.
Weight per cu. ft., lbs., 150.60.
Specific gravity, 2.414.
Average diameter, in., 5.77.
Average height, in., 7.12.
Area, sq. in., 26.14.
Compressive strength—
Total lbs., 14,570.
Lbs. per sq. in., 557.
Corrected to standard specimen—
Lbs. per sq. in., 523.
REMARKS—Height divided by diameter is 1.23, correction made by multiplying 
crushing strength by 0.94 (according to American Society for Testing Materials) 
Standard method for securing specimens of hardened concrete from the structure, 
Serial Designation C42-27; character of fracture—conical.
After coring, specimen was given three coats of shellac to prevent absorption of 
water during test for specific gravity. The smaller specimen of stone submitted, 
fractured during the coring process. A test for rate of absorption was made on a 
portion of this specimen and the following results were obtained:
Total time elapsed Per cent absorption by weight
10 minutes 0.59%





1 hour  10 minutes .75%
1 hour  20 minutes .75%
1 hour  30 minutes .77%
1 hour  40 minutes .77%
1 hour  50 minutes .79%
2 hours
2 hours 30 minutes .79%
Total porosity 2.25%
In making the above test, the rock was broken up into pieces passing a 1½-inch 
ring, and placed in a bottle of water; each piece was carefully brushed to remove 
loose particles; the total sample weighed 503.6 grams dry. At the end of 20 
minutes the samples had disintegrated in a very marked way, and a layer of sand 
about three-eighths of an inch deep was formed on the bottom of the bottle.
The absorption was measured by adding small amounts of water to keep the 
total volume constant, and the total porosity was obtained by evacuating the sample 
in the bottle.
Respectfully submitted.
RAYMOND G. OSBORNE LABORATORIES.
By S. S. Stahl.
— 21 —
REPORT OP COMPRESSION TESTS OF CONCRETE
Testing of Materials 
General





Hildreth & Company 
New York
Inspection Engineers






Office and Laboratories 
Rives-Strong Building
Phones Tucker 5222 
Tucker 1931
Representing
Falkenburg & Co. Seattle 
Chemical Engineers






REPORT OF COMPRESSION TESTS OF CONCRETE
Tests made for: Commission appointed by Governor Young to investigate failure of 
St. Francis Dam.
Description of specimens: Cylindrical cores approximately six inches diam. cut from 
blocks of concrete selected by Commission at dam site. Cores 
were cut by L. A. County Road Department, in presence of Mr. 
Perkins, and a representative of the laboratory.
LABORATORY DATA
Test number __________________________________17854 17855 1 7856
Specimen mark _____________________________                           3 4
Age ___________________________________ About 2 years 2 years 2 years
Weight, total lbs ______________________________   23.23 27.58 25.45
Weight, per cu. ft., lbs __________________________ 137.4 142.8 141.7
Specific gravity _______________________________ 2.202 2.289 2.271
Average diameter, in __________________________  5.89 5.85 5.85
Average height, in__________________________       11.50 12.50 11.75
Area, sq. in ________________________________ 27.25 26.88 26.88
Compressive strength
Total lbs_________________________________ 69,810 53,940 73,020
Lbs. per sq. in____________________________  2,562 2,007 2,717
CHARACTER OF FRACTURES—
Specimens 1 and 3 failed in planes nearly parallel to the axis of the specimen ;
No. 4 showed a partly conical fracture; Specimen No. 3 contained a spherical piece 
of soft conglomerate (?) about 2½ inches in diameter and one large piece of laminated 
stone probably mica schist. Specimen No. 2 broke while the ends were being pre­
pared for capping; a section broke off which revealed a large laminated stone, 
which rendered the core unfit for testing. The specific gravity of this stone was 2.705. 
REMARKS:
To expedite completion of tests, specimens were all tested as received, that is, air 
dry except for some water absorbed during the coring process. .
Tested in Olsen Universal Testing machine; speed of moving head—.05 inches 
per minute.
Tests witnessed by Messrs. Wiley, Bonner, Hyatt, and Perkins.
Respectfully submitted.
RAYMOND G. OSBORNE LABORATORIES.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONTACT PLANE BETWEEN CONCRETE AND FOUNDATION NEAR 









































FACE OF BUTTRESS AT WEST END OF MAIN DAM.
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